Guerra híbrida:

circunvalando la lógica nuclear

Abstract

In this article, we criticize the general nuclear equilibria thesis as stated by Neorealist school, based on which they found their recommendation that every state should develop nuclear weaponry. Our main argument against this idea is that equilibrium of power (and system stability that stem from it) depends not on specific features of the agents (like possessing or not a weapon) but on structural variables. Russian deployment of hybrid tactics supports the idea that, if systemic tensions prevail, states will find whatever means to channel them, in case direct war is prohibitive costly. To prove this point we identify hybrid war’s main attributes based on the literature available. Afterwards, we single out sets of general conditions and intermediate variables which turn rationale hybrid warfare. Russia’s annexation of Crimea will serve as example. Finally, we summarize the nuclear equilibria thesis’ main flaws in the conclusion section.