A look at the "Antecedents of the Conflict" around Malvinas Islands

Abstract

This article explores the circumstances surrounding the decision adopted by the national strategic leadership, in the stage prior to the armed confrontation between the Argentine Republic and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland. To get closer to them, we will rely on the "Antecedents of the Conflict" of the Rattenbach Report, on the testimonial statements, documents collected and produced by the Commission for the Analysis and Evaluation of the Responsibilities of the South Atlantic Conflict, which are attached to the Report. Final, as well as in other documents. Since profusely has been written on the subject over the course of four decades, we will try to address events from the time of the Final Report. Without intending to close the debate, we will focus on the reaction and the appreciation made by the government, at the time of making the decision, seeking to reveal that the rationality for the use of military power does not constitute per se an invalid strategic option. Its invalidity arises when the decisions come from reactions, provoked by the antagonist, that prevail over a rational appreciation of reality.